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Non-technical	summary	
The effectiveness of patents to stimulate R&D is often limited. If innovation is sequential and 
complementary, patent protection may even stifle technical advance (Bessen and Maskin, 
2006). The surge of patenting in complex technologies suggests that firms accumulate large 
patent portfolios rather to secure freedom to operate (Grindley and Teece, 1997). This raises 
concerns that the increasing costs for securing IPR might “tax” innovation (Jaffe and Lerner, 
2004; Bessen and Meurer, 2008).  
Patents provide a right to exclude but not necessarily a right to use. Surging patent filings has 
resulted in thickets of overlapping patents (Hall et al., 2012). These mutual blocking 
relationships among multiple firms are difficult to resolve. IP ownership is fragmented which 
raises coordination costs and royalty stacks (von Graevenitz et al., 2011). 
The uncertain scope of patent protection may furthermore result in inadvertent patent 
infringement (Reitzig et al., 2007, 2010). For capital-intensive innovators, this poses the risk 
of their high commitment level being exploited. Inadvertently infringed patent owners may 
capture part of their fruits from investment if infringed patent owners have invested less 
relationship-specifically (Farrell et al., 2007).  
This study asks whether firms are less likely to invest in innovation if IP ownership is 
fragmented or if owners of overlapping patents are less capital intensive, respectively. 
Citations among German owners of European patents are used to identify owners of 
overlapping patents. It is usually difficult to identify relationship-specific investments 
directly. Fixed tangible assets appear, however, as feasible proxy (Antràs, 2003). 
Using data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel, I find that fragmented IP reduces the 
investment propensity of firms with small patent portfolios. This suggests that market entry is 
difficult for firms lacking large patent portfolios as bargaining chips for licenses. Firms with 
large patent portfolios are less likely to invest in innovation if they cite owners of overlapping 
patents with smaller stocks of fixed capital. This suggests that large innovators incorporate the 
risk of held up application-specific capital in their investment decisions. Hence, the effects of 
patent thickets on innovation appear not uniform among firms.  	
Das	Wichtigste	in	Kürze	
Patente sind oft wenig effektiv als Anreizmechanismus für Forschung und Entwicklung. Falls 
sequentielle Innovationsaktivitäten komplementär sind, vermögen Patente den technischen 
Fortschritt sogar zu bremsen (Bessen und Maskin, 2006). Obwohl Patente in komplexen 
Technologien wenig effektiv sind, bauen Firmen große Patentportfolios auf (Grindley and 
Teece, 1997). Dies scheint der Sicherung ihrer freien Geschäftstätigkeit zu dienen und führte 
zu einer Patentexplosion. Dickichte sich überlappender Patente waren die Folge. Diese teure 
und defensive Sicherung intellektueller Eigentumsrechte wird oft als Innovationshemmnis 
betrachtet (Jaffe und Lerner, 2004; Bessen und Meurer, 2008).  
Patente gewähren ein Ausschlussrecht aber nicht notwendigerweise ein Nutzungsrecht. 
Patentdickichte erzeugen also wechselseitige Blockaden unter einer Vielzahl von 
Patentinhabern. Diese Dickichte sind schwierig aufzulösen. Lizenzgebühren und 
Koordinierungskosten können sich auftürmen, wenn intellektuelles Eigentum fragmentiert ist 
(von Graevenitz et al., 2011). 
Die Grenzen eines Patentrechtes sind darüber hinaus oft unklar, was zu ungewollten 
Patentverletzungen führen kann (Reitzig et al., 2007, 2010). Für kapitalintensive Innovatoren 
kann dies ein erhebliches Risiko darstellen. Eine blockierte kommerzielle Nutzung 
gebundenen Kapitals könnte durch Patentinhaber mit weniger gebundenem Kapital ausgenutzt 
werden (Farrell et al., 2007).  
Dieses Papier untersucht, ob die Wahrscheinlichkeit in Innovation zu investieren sinkt, 
wenn intellektuelles Eigentum fragmentiert ist bzw. wenn die Eigentümer überlappender 
Patente weniger kapitalintensiv sind. Patentzitationen unter deutschen Inhabern europäischer 
Patente sollen dabei die Eigentümer sich überlappender Patentrechte identifizieren. Das 
tangible Anlagevermögen dient als Proxy für das gebundene Kapital (Antràs, 2003). 
Daten des Mannheimer Innovationspanels zeigen, dass Firmen mit kleinen 
Patentportfolios seltener in Innovationen investieren wenn das intellektuelle Eigentum 
fragmentiert ist. Der Markteintritt ohne große Patentportfolios scheint also schwierig zu sein. 
Firmen mit großen Portfolios investieren demgegenüber seltener in Innovation wenn sie 
Patentinhaber mit kleinerem Anlagevermögen zitieren. Große Innovatoren scheinen das 
Risiko blockierten Kapitals in ihre Investitionsentscheidung miteinzubeziehen. 
Patentdickichte scheinen also die Innovationstätigkeit auf unterschiedliche Weise zu 
beeinflussen. 
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Abstract 
Thickets of partially overlapping patent rights raise costs to secure IPR for innovation. 
Fragmented IP ownership raises coordination costs to resolve mutual blockades. 
Inadvertent patent infringement poses the risk of fruits from investments to be exploited. 
A gap in economic commitment levels may be exploited if capital-intensive innovators 
have more invested application-specifically than inadvertently infringed IPR owners. I 
study whether fragmentation or heterogeneous capital-intensities among owners of 
overlapping patents affect propensities to invest in innovation. I find that firms with small 
patent portfolios are less likely to invest in innovation if IPR is fragmented. Firms with 
large patent portfolios are less likely to invest in innovation if cited patent owners have 
smaller stocks of fixed capital. This suggests that effects of patent thickets on innovation 
are not evenly spread among innovating firms.1 
Keywords: Investment in innovation, Complementary assets, IP hazards  
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1. Introduction	
Markets for technologies and IP have become increasingly important for innovation in 
recent years (Arora et al., 2004; Chesbrough, 2003). Transactions for patent-protected 
technology have grown steadily in number and volume (Athreye and Cantwell, 2007). 
Trade in technology expands the division of innovative labor between upstream research 
and development (R&D) and downstream commercialization of innovation. This suggests 
efficiency gains due to specialization on comparative advantages and associated learning, 
scale and incentive economies.  
Transactions for technological knowledge are subject to Arrow’s disclosure problem 
(1962). Buyers can judge their valuation only if the technology is revealed. However, the 
potential buyer can hardly be excluded from utilizing the technological information after 
its disclosure. Patents serve as safeguards for technology suppliers as they provide a legal 
remedy against infringers. Patents appear, therefore, as prerequisite for technology 
markets to emerge. Strong intellectual property protection facilitates technology 
transactions (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Gans et al., 2008). They promote a vertical 
specialization and entry of specialized technology suppliers (Arora and Merges, 2004).  
However, strengthening patent protection stimulates R&D only modestly (Kortum 
and Lerner, 1999; Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001; Lerner, 2002). Furthermore, the 
escalating number of patent applications occurs predominantly in complex technologies. 
In complex technologies, patents are considered as little effective to protect innovation 
(Levin et al., 1987). This suggests that firms accumulate patent rights rather to secure 
their freedom to operate (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Cohen et al., 2000). Concerns have 
been raised that increasing costs for securing intellectual property rights might “tax” 
innovation (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Bessen and Meurer, 2008).  
Transaction costs are an important part of these costs to secure IPR (Gambardella et 
al., 2007). Difficulties to trade technology are grounded in the imperfect property 
characteristics of patents. Patents provide a right to exclude but not necessarily a right to 
use the invention. Innovating firms have the right to use the invention for commercial 
exploitation if they secure all overlapping exclusion rights. However, escalating patent 
filings create thickets of partially overlapping patent rights which render this task 
difficult. For instance, IP ownership in thickets is usually fragmented which raises 
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coordination costs and royalty stacks (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001, von 
Graevenitz et al., 2011).  
The uncertain scope of patent rights increases the difficulty to trade technology even 
further (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). Courts may confine fuzzy boundaries of overlapping 
patent rights but this is seldom the case. Hence, escalating patent filings pose the risk of 
inadvertent patent infringement for innovating firms (Reitzig et al., 2010). Patent citations 
might refer to such owners of partially overlapping patent rights as innovation is usually 
sequential and cumulative (Merges and Nelson, 1990; Scotchmer, 1991). 
The intensive patenting of capital-intensive firms has resulted in surging patent filings 
in recent years (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). This suggests that the risk of held-up business 
operations is an important concern for large, innovative firms (Ziedonis, 2004). There is 
evidence that large firms are increasingly targeted in patent litigation (Bessen and Meurer 
2005, 2006; Hall and Ziedonis, 2007; Bessen et al., 2011). Their large investments appear 
to be partially sunk and committed to use specific technology.  It is usually difficult to 
identify relationship-specific investments directly (see Tucker, 2012 for an exception). 
Fixed tangible assets appear, however, as feasible proxy for them (Caves and Bradburd, 
1988; Antràs, 2003). 
Hold-up risks originate particularly from small, capacity-constrained patent owners 
(Reitzig et al., 2007). Inadvertently infringed patent owners may capture part of the fruits 
from innovating firm’s investment if relationship-specific investments of the innovating 
firm exceed their own relationship-specific investments (Farrell et al., 2007). Hence, the 
empirical approach will rely on the magnitude by which citing firm’s fixed capital stocks 
exceed those of an average cited patent owner as proxy for their different commitment 
levels. This different commitment level may be exploited during inadvertent infringement 
of overlapping patents. 
With the exception of Cockburn et al. (2010), evidence on the effects of patent 
thickets on product market innovation is rare. This study asks whether firms are less 
likely to invest in innovation if IP ownership is fragmented or if different commitment 
levels may be exploited during inadvertent patent infringement. The application-
specificity of investments in innovation might render them susceptible to these 
transactional hazards. The empirical analysis will be based on firm-level information 
from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP). In order to augment the available financial 
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information for cited patent owners, the standardized names of German patent applicants 
at the European patent office are linked to the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP).  
I find that IP fragmentation and different commitment levels affect investments in 
innovation not uniformly for small and large firms. Fragmented intellectual property 
appears to reduce the investment propensity of in-licensing firms with small patent 
portfolios. This suggests that entry in innovative product markets is difficult for firms 
which lack large patent portfolios as bargaining chips for external licenses. Firms with 
large patent portfolios appear less likely to invest in innovation if they cite owners of 
overlapping patents with smaller stocks of fixed capital. This suggests that large 
innovators incorporate the risk of held up application-specific capital in their investment 
decisions. 
This study proceeds in the following way. The next section discusses the 
susceptibility of investments in innovation for transactional IP hazards. Section 2.2 
elaborates the risk of innovation-specific investments to be held up during inadvertent 
patent infringement. Section 2.3 discusses the innovation-hampering effect of fragmented 
IPR ownership. Section 3 describes the various data sources and the construction of 
variables. Section 4 presents the empirical findings and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Hypothesis	development	
2.1. Complementary assets 
Strategy development for the commercialization of new technologies hinges on markets 
for technologies (Gans and Stern, 2003). Technology is commercialized in innovation. 
Innovation creates new value propositions or improves the cost-effectiveness of 
production. The translation of technology into innovation requires complementary assets, 
like manufacturing, marketing capabilities, etc. Innovation will refer subsequently to 
downstream commercialization of technology. Technology may be developed internally 
or provided by upstream suppliers. 
Technology owners may access complementary assets over markets at competitive terms 
if these assets are generic. Generic assets are not adjusted to particular innovations 
(Teece, 1986). Complementary assets appear, however, often to be specialized and 
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difficult to acquire over markets. The difficulty to access complementary assets for 
technology-intensive start-ups creates a competitive advantage for incumbent firms. Start-
up entry into product markets for instance is less likely if it requires access to 
complementary assets (Shane, 2001). Start-up cooperation with incumbents (e. g. via 
licensing) is more likely if competitive entry is associated with sunk costs (Gans et al., 
2002; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006). Hence, incumbent owners of complementary assets 
are more likely to survive and adapt to waves of radical technological change (Tripsas, 
1997; Rothaermel, 2001).  
Assets are valuable firm resources if they are firm-specific, rare and difficult to imitate 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991, Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Specialized 
complementary assets are built in a path-dependent and idiosyncratic process and can be 
considered as valuable resources (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Teece et al., 1997). They 
appear to be a source of competitive advantage as they erect entry barriers to downstream 
product markets. This favors incumbents in the division of innovation rents with upstream 
technology providers.  
When complementary assets are specialized, upstream technology owners are unilaterally 
dependent on access to them. Since these resources are difficult to substitute and subject 
to market failure, they generate economic rents for their owners. Resources which are 
specific to certain applications are particularly hard to substitute. This renders 
application-specific assets particularly valuable. 
However, asset specificity constrains their owners at the same time to utilize them in a 
broader range of applications. Thus, the capacity of complementary assets to generate 
economic rents is inversely related to the range of market opportunities to which these 
resources could be applied with negligible switching costs (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 
1988; Silverman, 1999).  
The importance of complementary assets for their incumbent owners suggests that they 
are, at least partially, application-specific (Ceccagnoli et al., 2010). Specialization and 
specificity are characteristic for co-specialized complementary assets (Jacobides et al., 
2006). The application-specificity of co-specialized assets creates a bilateral dependence 
between technology providers and users. Application-specificity of complementary assets 
may, thus, deteriorate the favorable bargaining position of their owners when the division 
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of value from innovation is negotiated with technology providers (Williamson, 1975; 
Pisano, 1990).  
 
2.2. Different commitment levels during inadvertent  
patent infringement 
This trade-off between asset specialization and asset specificity has to be taken into 
account for investment decisions in complementary assets. Asset specialization is a 
precondition for economic rents. However, specialized assets are usually also application- 
and technology-specific. Deploying these assets to alternative applications is associated 
with adjustment and switching costs. These switching costs create a lock-in situation 
which deteriorates the bargaining position when the division of value from innovation is 
negotiated with technology providers.  
Such transactional hazards emerge when unprogrammed adaptation, lock-in and 
appropriable quasi-rents, i. e. rents which do not arise in other factor combinations, are 
present (Joskow, 1991). Innovation processes require ongoing mutually adjustments 
among technology and subsequent commercialization activities (Kline and Rosenberg, 
1986). Hence, the value of innovation could be regarded as quasi-rent. Of course, 
innovating firms have strong incentives to secure the necessary technology rights before 
investing into application-specific assets. Contracting for technology is, however, 
notoriously incomplete. Ex-ante licenses might not eliminate the risk of inadvertent patent 
infringement entirely (Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Gallini, 2002; Bessen, 2004). 
At the heart of this contractual imperfection lies the inability of intellectual property 
rights to transfer definite usage rights. Patents confer a right to exclude others from 
practicing the technology but do neither confer rights to use nor rights to its benefits. The 
right to use and benefit from technology is granted implicitly when no patentee owns 
further infringing exclusion rights. This distinction between usage and exclusion rights is 
important for complex technologies. Surging patent applications and the ineffectiveness 
of patents to protect complex technological knowledge create thickets of partially 
overlapping patent rights. von Graevenitz et al. (2011) provide evidence that overlapping 
patent portfolios among multiple patent owners are prevalent in complex technologies. 
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Hence, the scope of patent rights remains uncertain unless brought to court (Lemley and 
Shapiro, 2005).  
Fuzzy boundaries of intellectual property rights leave contracts in technology transactions 
incomplete. Ballooning numbers of patent applications augment further the risk of 
inadvertently infringing prior art (Reitzig et al., 2010). If innovating firms face the risk of 
inadvertently infringing overlapping patents, propensities to invest in specialized assets 
diminish according to the diffuse entitlement theory (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). 
Specialized technology suppliers have become more important in recent years (Arora et 
al., 2004). This reflects partly a successful division of innovative labor. Quality 
advantages of external technology surely compensate transaction costs in many cases 
(Arora and Merges, 2004). Innovating firms rely more likely on external technology if the 
supplying industry is R&D-intensive (Acemoglu et al., 2010). However, some specialized 
technology suppliers may act opportunistically by maneuvering large, capital-intensive 
technology users into infringement (Reitzig et al., 2007, 2010). Whether technology 
suppliers act opportunistically or not, they should be able to negotiate surprisingly high 
licensing rewards if technology user’s bargaining situation is deteriorated by high 
switching costs.   
Investments in fixed tangible assets appear as an important form of economic 
commitment. Caves and Bradburd (1988) report a positive cross-industry correlation 
between vertical integration and capital-labor intensities. Antràs (2003) shows that 
international trade is more likely intra-firm if the capital-labor intensity is high. Although 
situations of locked-in assets are not determined directly, this suggests that fixed capital 
stocks are partially sunk and application-specific.  
Inadvertently infringing firms with large application-specific investments may find 
themselves in an unfavorable bargaining situation. Residual patent owners may exploit 
the high commitment level if there is a gap between their relationship-specific 
investments (Farrell et al. 2007).2 They may be able to capture the fruits from held-up 
investments to the extent by which relationship-specific investments of the held-up firm 
                                                 
2
 Surprisingly high rewards for IP owners might result also from insufficient incentives to challenge weak 
patents among competing firms (Farrell and Shapiro, 2008). Patent challenges appear particularly seldom 
among multiple mutually blocking firms at the center of patent thickets (von Graevenitz et al., 2012b).  
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exceed those of the residual patent owner. This expropriation risk might diminish 
innovation-specific investments.  
Hence, firms should be less likely to invest in innovation-specific assets if they have 
higher stocks of fixed capital, and thereby higher commitment levels, than owners of 
overlapping patents. Inadvertently infringed owners of overlapping patents might exploit 
this gap in economic commitment levels. This rationale is summarized in the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H1a: Firms are less likely to invest in innovation if they are more capital-intensive than 
owners of overlapping IPR.  
 
Large, innovative firms are increasingly targeted in patent litigation (Bessen and Meurer 
2005, 2006; Hall and Ziedonis, 2007; Bessen et al., 2011). This suggests that concerns 
regarding operational freedom are not hypothetical. Ziedonis (2004) shows that 
semiconductor firms patent more intensively if they are capital-intensive and technology 
ownership is fragmented. This suggests that high patenting intensities reflect a defensive 
policy of firms with large application-specific investments (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; 
Hegde et al., 2009). Their large patent portfolios are not intended to be asserted in the first 
place. They should rather pose the threat of countersuits when infringement is claimed. 
This shall induce cross-licensing agreements among owners of mutually infringing patent 
portfolios (Grindley and Teece, 1997).  
Defensive patenting and cross-licenses might mitigate the risk from inadvertent patent 
infringement. Cross-licensing is frequent among symmetric and large firms (Nagaoka and 
Kwon, 2006; Siebert and von Graevenitz, 2010). The economic commitment level of both 
parties is similar here and expropriation risks appear limited among them. The increasing 
hazard rates of being targeted in patent litigation for large firms suggest, on the other 
hand, that defensive patenting is little effective to mitigate inadvertent patent 
infringement and expropriation risks from small, specialized technology vendors. Hence, 
firms with large patent portfolios appear particularly vulnerable to the exploitation of 
different commitment levels. This is summarized in the following hypothesis: 
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H1b: Firms with large patent portfolios are less likely to invest in innovation if they are 
more capital-intensive than owners of overlapping IPR.  
 
2.3. Fragmented IPR ownership 
Granting patent rights facilitates not only technology transactions. Inventors are awarded 
exclusion rights in return for disclosing the new technology. The revealed technological 
knowledge may then serve as starting point for other researchers. This facilitates further 
development of the technology (Scotchmer 1991). Duplicative R&D is avoided if 
technology is developed in this sequential and cumulative way. This is particularly 
important for technologies in which inventions tend to be incorporated into larger 
technical systems (Merges and Nelson, 1990). 
Cumulative invention processes may lead to situations in which follow-on inventors 
possess exclusion rights but not the right to use the follow-on technology. Overlapping 
patents for basic inventions may block the use of follow-on inventions. The need to 
assemble multiple patents from various owners is, however, not a new phenomenon 
(Lampe and Moser, 2010). What has changed is the number of involved patent rights and 
technology owners (Somaya et al., 2011). Technical advance appears more cumulative 
today (Walsh et al., 2003; Greenstein, 2010). This causes concerns that fragmented patent 
rights may stifle R&D and innovation if technological advance is sequential and 
complementary (Graff et al. 2003; Bessen and Maskin, 2009; Bessen and Hunt, 2007). 
Fragmented property rights may impose transaction costs for innovating firms even if ex-
ante licenses are feasible. The right to use and commercialize an invention requires 
licenses from each owner of overlapping patent rights. Each of these patent owners might 
foreclose rents from technology commercialization in innovation. Resolving mutual 
blocking relationships between more than two parties is difficult. Optimal bargaining 
behavior in bilateral negotiations depends on other parties’ actions. This raises 
coordination costs substantially compared to situations of bilateral ownership (von 
Graevenitz et al., 2011). Attempts to secure licenses from multiple owners of overlapping 
patents might furthermore result in stacking royalty payments (Shapiro, 2001). This 
suggests that usage rights are more costly to secure if IP ownership is fragmented. 
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Such difficulties to secure fragmented IPR appear to reduce R&D activities (Clark and 
Konrad, 2008; Noel and Schankerman, 2006). Evidence on stifled innovation activities is, 
however, rare. Cockburn et al. (2010) is an exception. They study the effects of 
fragmented upstream IPR on downstream innovation performance. They find that IPR 
fragmentation reduces product innovation performance for those firms which have to 
license-in patents.3 On the other hand, the innovative performance of firms which do not 
license in appears to be positively affected by fragmentation. This suggests that the need 
to establish large patent portfolio as bargaining chip for securing IPR disadvantages entry 
of small firms if technology is complex and IPR is fragmented (Cockburn and 
MacGarvie, 2011; Graevenitz et al. 2012a). This is summarized in the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H2a: The propensity to invest in innovation is lower if IPR ownership is fragmented.  
H2b: The propensity of small firms to invest in innovation is lower if IPR ownership is 
fragmented.   
 
3. Data	and	variables		
3.1. Data  
 The data is obtained from three different sources: the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), 
firm-level information from Creditreform (Germany's largest credit rating agency) and 
patent data from the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database.  
My sample is based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) which is a stratified 
random sample of German firms with at least five employees.4 The survey is based on the 
concepts and definitions of the OECD Oslo Manual (2005) for collecting innovation data. 
The sample refers to information on manufacturing corporations for the years 1993 to 
                                                 
3
 Evidence of Galasso and Schankerman (2010) on the duration of patent disputes suggests contrarily that 
technology has diffused more quickly during periods of weak patent protection if IP ownership is 
fragmented. This positive effect of IPR fragmentation on technology diffusion appears, however, much 
weaker after patent rights have been strengthened. 
4
 See Janz et al. (2001) for a more detailed description of the Mannheim Innovation Panel. 
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2006. The sample is restricted to firms which have, at least once, relied on external R&D 
or acquired external knowledge. Stifling effects of the patent landscape on innovation 
appear particularly important for those firms (Cockburn et al., 2010). Due to lacking 
information on some explanatory variables, data referring to 1999 and 2000 does not 
enter the sample. This results in an estimation sample of 968 observations. 
The MIP asks firms about their annual gross investment in fixed assets. Separated 
thereof, investments associated to innovation projects is surveyed. This includes the 
acquisition of advanced machinery, facilities, software and other external knowledge for 
innovation purposes. Hence, surveyed investments in innovation consist in large parts of 
physical investments. I study whether patent landscape characteristics affect the 
propensity to invest in these innovation-related assets. As robustness check, the patent 
landscape effects on innovation-related investments are contrasted with their effects on 
residual investment and R&D propensities.5   
Furthermore, EPO patent data has been linked to the Mannheim Enterprise Panel (MUP). 
This data match shall augment the available financial information on owners of cited 
patents. The MUP is a firm-level database collected by Creditreform, the largest credit 
rating agency in Germany. Creditreform gathers this financial information from 
publications of firm’s annual balance sheets. Since 1999, the MUP reflects a full copy of 
Creditreform's data warehouse. It can be assumed that this data covers nearly all firms 
economically active in Germany. In the preceding years, the MUP consists of 
Creditreform's entire firm-level data on newly established firms and a stratified random 
sample of established German firms.6  
 
3.2. The proxy for different commitment levels 
Ideal information would characterize the technologies used or built on by the firm and 
identify owners of overlapping rights. Patent citations provide indirect evidence on 
                                                 
5
 Investments in innovation might be R&D-related. However, R&D expenditures are usually considered to 
consist mainly of salaries for research personnel and ongoing expenditures for equipment and materials. 
6
 Not all patents are renewed to full term (Pakes, 1986; Schankerman and Pakes, 1986). However, cited 
patents should be more important and longer valid than an average one as EPO examiners are encouraged 
to describe the state of prior art within a minimum of citations (Michel and Bettels, 2001).   
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overlapping patent rights only. The eligibility of applications for patent protection is 
evaluated against a list of citations which describe the state of prior art. Patent examiners 
assemble this list at the EPO (Michel and Bettels, 2001; Harhoff et al. 2006). Patent 
citations reveal, thus, technological linkages across generations of inventions (Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg 2002). The scope of individual patent rights within this sequence of 
inventions remains uncertain unless brought to court. Hence, the set of cited patents in 
firm’s patent portfolio may pose the risk of inadvertent patent infringement for the citing 
firm.  
If cited patents are infringed inadvertently, their owners may be able to capture part of 
the fruits from infringing firm’s investments. This requires an exploitable gap in their 
economic commitment levels. Fixed tangible assets should, at least partially, reflect an 
economic commitment. The difference in fixed capital stocks ∆Fixed Assets between the 
citing and the median of cited patent owner appears as a reasonable proxy for different 
commitment levels between citing and cited firms. Median fixed capital stocks shall 
proxy the commitment level of an average cited patent owner. Figure 1 illustrates this 
empirical approach. 
 
Figure 1 Capital stock difference to an average cited patent owner 
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The estimation sample consists of 395 firms which have filed 195 thousand patent 
applications at the EPO. The eligibility of these applications for patent protection is 
evaluated against a list of 528 thousand patents. 68 thousand citations are self-citations. 
69 thousand cited patents have been filed 20 years before the citing patent and are 
expired.7 Among the remaining set of backward citations, 24 percent are patents granted 
by the EPO. 28 thousand thereof are filed by German applicants. Patent applicants could 
be matched with MUP data for 20 thousand observations. Financial information for cited 
applicants is available for 18 thousand applications from which median fixed capital 
stocks are calculated. These 1400 standardized applicant names, for which financial 
information is available, refer to three-quarter of cited EPO patents with German 
applicants. Financial information appears to be available for patenting-intensive firms, in 
particular. 
 
3.3. The fragmentation index 
Fragmented IP ownership is another characteristic of the patent landscape which 
might hamper technology commercialization. Ziedonis (2004) introduces a Herfindahl-
type measure for fragmented ownership of cited patents according to 
2
1
1
ij i
i
j i i
references referencesfrag
references references
   
= −    
−   
∑
 
Referencesi refers here to the number of backward citations in firm i's patent 
portfolio. Referencesij indicates the number of patents of company j which are cited in the 
stock of patent applications of firm i in year t.8 The second product term within the 
summation refers to Hall's (2005) bias correction of Herfindahl-type measures.  
Cockburn et al. (2010) propose to measure fragmented IP ownership on the 
technology level. The fragmentation index for technology k, fragk, refers to the set of 
backwards citations listed in all MIP firms’ patent applications in technology k. The 
                                                 
7
 Not all patents are renewed to full term (Pakes, 1986; Schankerman and Pakes, 1986). However, cited 
patents should be more important and longer valid than an average one as EPO examiners are encouraged 
to describe the state of prior art within a minimum of citations (Michel and Bettels, 2001).   
8
 The formula omits the time index for simplicity. 
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technology area k corresponds to the OST-INPI/FhG-ISI technology classification 
(OECD, 1994). Figure 2 illustrates this approach. 
I will use subsequently a firm-level fragmentation index according to 
1 2
1 2
1 2
...
with      ...
i i iK
i k k k K
i i i
i i i iK
n n nfrag frag frag frag
n n n
n n n n
= = =
= + + +
= + + +
. 
This is calculated as weighted average of technology-specific fragmentation indices 
fragk. ni refers here to the size of firm i's patent portfolio and nik refers to portfolio size in 
technology k. 
 
Figure 2 Fragmentation indices 
 
 
3.4. Further control variables 
Financial information on cited patent owners is only available for German applicants 
of EPO patents. This raises validity concerns regarding the capital stock measure for an 
average cited patent owner. Figure 1 shows that financial information on cited patent 
owners is not available for patents granted by other patent offices or for cited non-
German applicants. As long as patents from various origins pose similar risks of 
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inadvertent infringement and expropriation, the share of citations to non-German 
applicants as well as the share of cited non-EPO patents might control for missing 
information.  
Investments in innovation should be more likely if technological opportunity is high 
(Klevorick et al., 1995). The share of triadic patent applications in a 4-digit technology 
class is calculated in order to proxy for technological opportunities. Triadic patents are 
inventions for which patent protection is sought at three major patent offices; the 
European Patent Office (EPO), the US Patent and Trademark Office and the Japanese 
patent office. The protected invention appears, thus, important to their applicants 
(Putnam, 1996). The technological opportunity for firm i is proxied as weighted average 
of triadic patent shares.  
Further control variables include qualitative information on firm’s R&D policy, patent 
portfolio and firm size as well as firm’s credit rating.9 Logarithmized age and its square 
shall control for the dynamics of investment activity (Cooper et al. 1999). Furthermore, 
the stock of fixed tangible capital as well as labor input is included. 
 
3.5. Descriptive Statistics 
My sample includes manufacturing corporations in Germany which have applied for 
patent protection at the EPO. It is further restricted to firms which have at least once 
relied on external technology. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the 968 
observations. The sample includes overwhelmingly large companies. The mean number 
of employees is 3800 with a minimum of 8 and maximum of 426 thousand employees. 
Investments in innovation are very frequent among them. 90 percent invest in innovation-
specific machinery and equipment. This extraordinarily high proportion reflects the 
sample restriction to patenting firms. Non-innovation related investments appear similarly 
frequent. R&D activity of sample firms is also very high. 83 percent is continuously 
engaged in R&D. 
                                                 
9
 Firm size might eventually introduce an endogeneity bias. Measuring firm size in number of employees 
might minimize these concerns. The regulated labor market in Germany causes high adjustment costs. 
This should lead firms to smooth labor input over time.  
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Ownership of cited patents appears dispersed. The fragmentation indices range from 94 to 
98 percent. Matched financial information indicates a very skew distribution of fixed 
tangible assets among cited patent owners. The median lies at EUR 415 million and the 
maximum value amounts to EUR 11 billion. Sample firms have invested less than the 
average cited patent owner in most cases. These have invested EUR 346 million in fixed 
tangible assets on average. The mean capital stock differential ∆Fixed Assets is negative 
and lies at EUR -800 million, i. e. sample firms have invested EUR 800 million less on 
average than an average cited patent owner. Differences in number of employees also 
show that citing sample firms are mostly smaller than an average cited firm. Differences 
in number of employees are additionally calculated in order to verify whether capital 
stock differences reflect size effects.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Sample firms appear financially sound. Creditreform assigns credit ratings of a scale 
from 100 to 500 in which the former indicates the best rating. The mean rating is 180 and 
the standard deviation is 50. This does not suggest that financing difficulties constrain 
sample firm’s investments. 
In order to avoid biases due to missing financial information for cited patent owners, 
the share of cited patents which are not granted by the EPO and the share of cited non-
German patent applicants are included in the estimations. Citations included in EPO 
patents refer frequently to EPO patents. This is the case for 40 percent of cited patents. 
Application language appears also important. 62 percent of cited patents have German 
applicants. 
 
Table 2 about here 
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4. Econometric	evidence	
Table 3 reports the average marginal effects on investment propensities from Probit 
estimations.  It reports marginal effects on the propensity to invest in R&D, in innovation-
related machinery and equipment and in other assets which are not innovation-related.  It 
is expected that negative effects of heterogeneous or fragmented IP ownership are most 
pronounced for innovation-specific investments if they reflect IP-related hazards.   
Propensities to invest in innovation are largely explained by R&D policies, firm age 
and size. The marginal effects of fixed capital stock differentials ∆Fixed Assets are 
negative at a 5 percent level of significance. This effect appears specific to investments in 
innovation. R&D propensities and residual investments are not significantly correlated 
with ∆Fixed Assets. This negative effect could refer to IP hazards due to different 
commitment levels. However, it could also show that large patent owners invest less in 
further innovation than smaller patent owners. If this is the case, ∆No. of Employees 
should exhibit a similar negative effect on innovative investment propensities. Table 3 
shows that this seems not to be the case. It could not be confirmed that the negative effect 
is due to size differentials between citing and cited patentees.  
If the effect of ∆Fixed Assets reflects hazards due to different commitment levels, the 
negative effect should be, furthermore, particularly pronounced for firms with large patent 
portfolios. Table 4 presents estimations for firms with large or small patent portfolios. 
The median number of 27 patent applications is used to divide the samples. ∆Fixed Assets 
shows no significant effects on innovative investments for firms with small patent 
portfolios. Small firms are not more likely to invest in innovation with increasingly large 
cited patent owners. The marginal effect of ∆Fixed Assets on innovation propensities is 
significant at the 5 percent level for firms with large patent portfolios. Hence, large 
corporations appear less inclined to invest in application-specific assets when the average 
cited patent owner is less capital-intensive. This suggests different commitment level 
between large citing corporations and cited patent owners which might be susceptible to 
exploitation during inadvertent patent infringement. 
Fragmented ownership of cited patents does not appear to affect investments in 
innovation if ∆Fixed Assets is controlled for. Fragmentation diminishes innovation 
propensities on a low level of significance if the estimation equation excludes ∆Fixed 
Assets. Adding a non-linear fragmentation term improves the level of significance for 
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fragmentation to a 5 percent level. The marginal effect appears to diminish slightly with 
increasing fragmentation. This might indicate that highly fragmented IP ownership 
diminishes the value at stake in bilateral patent disputes which might speed up settlement 
to some low extent (Gallasso and Schankerman, 2010). 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Fragmented ownership of backward citations does not show significant effects on 
innovative investments of large firms. Innovation activities of firms with small patent 
portfolios appear weakly affected by fragmented IP. IP fragmentation reduces their 
propensity to invest in innovation at a 10 percent level of significance. This suggests that 
entry into innovative markets is difficult in the absence of large patent portfolios if IPR 
ownership is fragmented (Cockburn et al., 2010; von Graevenitz et al., 2012a).  
 
Table 4 to Table 7 about here 
 
Table 5 to Table 7 present estimation results which refine the proxy for different 
commitment levels ∆Fixed Assets. These measures refer to different subsets of cited 
patent owners. Capital stock differences to the smallest and largest cited patent owner, to 
owners of blocking and not blocking patents as well as to owners of highly or seldom 
cited patents are, thereby, considered. With exception of ∆Fixed Assets to the most cited 
patentee, all these measures significantly reduce the propensity to invest in innovation. 
Their effects on residual investment propensities and R&D propensities are either 
insignificant or positive. Hence, the negative effects of ∆Fixed Assets on investment 
propensities appear innovation-specific.  
Subsequently, the marginal effects of changing from the worst to the best bargaining 
position are approximated. The fragmentation index ranges from 0.94 to 0.98. A change 
from the least to the highest fragmentation reduces the propensity to invest in innovation 
by approximately 19 percentage points for firms with small patent portfolios. With regard 
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to capital stock differences, the worst bargaining situation is given by EUR 10 billion for 
∆Fixed Assets. In their best bargaining situation, ∆Fixed Assets is EUR -10 billion. The 
estimated marginal effects range is 51.3 10−× . Hence, switching from the best to the worst 
bargaining situation reduces investment propensities by roughly 26 percentage points.  
These magnitudes do not suggest collapsing technology adoptions due to imperfect 
intellectual property rights as it is postulated by the tragedy of anti-commons (Heller and 
Eisenberg, 1998). However, the estimated marginal effects should be considered as lower 
bounds. The estimation sample includes only patenting firms. Excluded firms lack patent 
portfolios that might serve as bargaining chip if IP ownership is fragmented.  The 
measure for differential commitment levels refers to fixed assets of cited German patent 
owners only. There might be further marginal overlapping patent rights which are not 
listed as state of the art references by patent examiners. These marginal rights might pose 
additional risks of inadvertent infringement (Reitzig et al., 2007, 2010). 
 
5. Conclusion	
Innovation combines often multiple technological components (Somaya et al., 2011). 
In view of escalating patent numbers, each of these components is frequently protected by 
multiple patents. Innovation requires access to thickets of partially overlapping patent 
rights then. This increases the costs for securing intellectual property rights which might 
stifle innovation (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Bessen and Meurer, 2008). 
Patent thickets can be characterized by mutual blocking rights among multiple parties 
(von Graevenitz et al., 2011). These constellations are difficult to resolve. Fragmented IP 
ownership raises coordination costs (Shapiro, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004). The uncertain scope 
of patent rights poses further the risk of inadvertently infringing overlapping rights 
(Lemley and Shapiro, 2005; Reitzig et al., 2010). Sunk investments in application-specific 
assets may leave innovating firms in an unfavorable bargaining position with residual 
patent owners (Reitzig et al., 2007, Farrell et al., 2007) 
Innovation-related assets are frequently considered as source of competitive 
advantage. However, their application-specificity might render them also vulnerable to 
IP-related hazards (Jacobides et al., 2006). This study asks whether propensities to invest 
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in innovation are lower when ownership of cited patents is fragmented or when owners of 
cited patents are less capital-intensive. 
Evidence on the effects of patent thickets on product market innovation is rare 
(Cockburn et al., 2010). The effects of fragmented or heterogeneous IP ownership appear 
not uniform among innovators. Firms with small patent portfolios have lower propensities 
to invest in innovation if IPR ownership is fragmented. In contrast, firms with large patent 
portfolios appear not to be affected by fragmented IP ownership. This suggests that entry 
into innovative markets is difficult without large patent portfolios if IPR ownership is 
fragmented.  
Overlapping patent rights pose the risk of inadvertent infringement. This may allow 
residual patent owners to exploit different economic commitment levels if the residual 
patent owner has invested less relationship-specifically than the infringed firm (Farrell et 
al., 2007). Relationship investments are difficult to identify. Fixed tangible assets appear, 
at least partially, application-specific (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Antràs, 2003). Different 
magnitudes of fixed tangible assets between citing and an average cited firm shall, 
therefore, proxy for the exploitable gap of application-specific investments between citing 
firms and residual owners of overlapping patents.  
Innovation propensities of firms with large patent portfolios are significantly lower if 
they are more capital-intensive than an average cited patent owner. I do not find evidence 
for higher investment propensities of firms with small patent portfolios if they are not less 
capital-intensive than an average cited patent owner. I do further not find evidence for 
lower innovation propensities if the citing firm has more employees than an average cited 
patent owner. This suggests a high commitment level of capital-intensive firms which is 
susceptible to exploitation by less committed residual patent owners. Large corporations 
appear to take these exploitation risks into account in their decision on investments in 
innovation. However, the evidence does not suggest technology commercialization to be 
collapsing due to imperfect IPR. In the worst case, investment propensities in innovation 
appear to be reduced by a range of 19 to 26 percentage points. 
Fragmented or heterogeneous IP ownership might also be reflected in lower 
investment volumes in innovation. This could provide further explanatory variation in 
addition to qualitative information on the decision to invest in innovation. However, I do 
not find investment intensities to be affected by these patent landscape characteristics. 
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This might be due to the veiled selection of innovation projects in total investment figures 
(Walsh et al., 2003; Chan et al., 2007).    
A limitation of this study is surely that financial information on cited patent owners is 
available for German applicants at the EPO only. The share of cited non-German 
applicants and other cited authorities should control for the limited information. This 
assumes that cited patents of non-German applicants and cited patents from other 
jurisdictions pose similar exploitation risks. Furthermore, this study identifies those 
overlapping patents only by which EPO examiners describe prior art. Prior art shall be 
described within a minimum number of documents there. This excludes likely marginal 
overlapping patents. These might pose further risks of inadvertent infringement and 
increase fragmentation further. This study does also not address whether tendencies to 
accumulate weak patents distort innovation incentives. This might be an interested avenue 
for future research. 
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Appendix	
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
 
  
Mean Std.dev. Min. Max.
Investments in Innovation 0.91 0.29 0 1
Residual Investments 0.89 0.31 0 1
Fragmentation Index                              96.84 0.88 93.76 98.23
∆Fixed Assets
§ -800 1565 -12827 10459
∆(No. of Employees)
§ 1621 18699 -52544 425998
Share Patents filed more than 20 years ago 0.31 0.15 0 0.82
Share Triadic Patents 0.82 0.14 0.00 1
ln (Patent stock) 3.58 1.67 0 10.25
Occasional R&D activities 0.09 0.29 0 1
Continuous R&D activities 0.83 0.37 0 1
Share of cited GPTO patents 0.24 0.10 0 0.63
Share of cited EPO patents 0.39 0.10 0.17 1
Share of cited USPTO patents 0.18 0.08 0 0.50
Share of cited JPO patents  0.03 0.05 0 0.50
Share of cited German Applicants 0.62 0.12 0.27 1
Share of cited European Applicants 0.34 0.12 0 0.86
Share of cited US Applicants 0.16 0.10 0 0.67
Share of cited Japanese Applicants 0.06 0.06 0 0.43
Credit rating 180 50.10 100 500
Fixed Asset Intensity
‡ 0.06 0.11 0.00 2.16
ln (No. of Employees) 6.66 1.51 2.08 12.96
ln (Age) 3.65 1.18 0 5.86
Part of Conglomerate 0.77 0.42 0 1
Labour Cost Intensity
‡ 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.17
Location in Eastern Germany 0.03 0.18 0 1
Low-Tech Manufacturing 0.33 0.47 0 1
Medium High-Tech Manufacturing 0.48 0.50 0 1
High-Tech Manufacturing 0.19 0.40 0 1
No. of. Observations
§
 in €mln 
‡
 per no. of employees
968
2 
 
 
Table 2 Correlation matrix 
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Table 3 Marginal effects on R&D, innovative and non-innovative investment propensities  
  
0.019 0.019 - 0.299* - 84.031** - 0.032 - 0.032 0.012 0.012
(0.021) (0.021) (0.176) (34.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
0.432**
(0.175)
0.000 - 0.000013** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000006) (0.000)
0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.077 0.075 1.027* 1.058* 0.047 0.057 0.093 0.089
(0.122) (0.121) (0.557) (0.558) (0.082) (0.083) (0.066) (0.062)
0.103 0.101 - 0.212 - 0.227 0.000 0.004 0.119 0.109
(0.076) (0.075) (0.537) (0.538) (0.064) (0.065) (0.079) (0.078)
- 0.004 - 0.004 0.163*** 0.158*** 0.017** 0.017** - 0.016 - 0.015
(0.012) (0.012) (0.06) (0.061) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
2.334*** 2.369*** 0.259*** 0.258*** - 0.083 - 0.080
(0.319) (0.325) (0.035) (0.035) (0.074) (0.072)
2.156*** 2.201*** 0.228*** 0.227*** - 0.040 - 0.040
(0.202) (0.207) (0.021) (0.021) (0.044) (0.044)
0.003** 0.003** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
- 0.162*** - 0.159*** - 0.005 0.194 0.042 0.037 0.074 0.070
(0.061) (0.057) (0.627) (0.684) (0.069) (0.075) (0.131) (0.126)
0.009 0.009 0.143** 0.142** 0.019** 0.020** 0.032*** 0.033***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.070) (0.070) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.01)
0.047* 0.047* 0.691*** 0.669*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.063 0.062
(0.028) (0.028) (0.219) (0.221) (0.025) (0.025) (0.042) (0.041)
0.975 0.983 - 0.129*** - 0.124*** - 0.013*** - 0.014*** - 0.010 - 0.010
(0.659) (0.67) (0.035) (0.035) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
0.086 0.124 0.021 0.019 - 0.004 - 0.006
(0.167) (0.168) (0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.028)
- 6.391 - 5.736 - 0.631 - 0.655 - 0.782 - 0.789
(5.068) (5.174) (0.569) (0.576) (0.936) (0.937)
0.036 0.035 - 0.066 - 0.035 0.006 0.006 - 0.083** - 0.079*
(0.065) (0.066) (0.338) (0.344) (0.039) (0.04) (0.038) (0.039)
0.042 0.042 - 0.154 - 0.125 - 0.016 - 0.016 - 0.034 - 0.033
(0.029) (0.042) (0.165) (0.167) (0.018) (0.018) (0.033) (0.033)
0.063* 0.062* 0.24 0.245 0.022 0.026 0.092** 0.091**
(0.035) (0.042) (0.225) (0.226) (0.025) (0.026) (0.039) (0.039)
Citation shares to authorities and applicant residence included
Year dummies included
No. of Observations
§
 in mi l l ion EUR 
‡
 per no. of employees
***
, 
**
, 
*
 i ndicate s i gni ficance of 1%, 5% or 10%
Medium High-Tech Manuf.
High-Tech Manufacturing
968
Fragmentation Index
2                              
ln(No.  of Employees)
ln(Age)
ln(Age)
2
Part of Conglomerate
Labour Cost Intensity
‡
Location in Eastern Germany
Share Triadic Patents
ln(Patent stock)
Occasional R&D activities
Continuous R&D activities
Credit rating
Fixed Asset Intensity
‡
Invest. in Innovation Residual Invest.
Fragmentation Index                              
∆Fixed Assets
§
∆(No. of Employees)
§
Share Patents filed >20y
R&D
4 
 
 
Table 4 Marginal effects by patent portfolio size 
 
 
- 0.045* - 0.033 - 0.035 - 0.037
(0.027) (0.030) (0.040) (0.04)
0.000 - 0.000013**
(0.000) (0.000005)
0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
- 0.049 - 0.057 0.088 0.108
(0.126) (0.127) (0.126) (0.130)
- 0.097 - 0.099 0.059 0.09
(0.103) (0.101) (0.095) (0.097)
0.022 0.02 0.008 0.01
(0.022) (0.022) (0.009) (0.01)
0.356*** 0.356*** 0.189*** 0.173***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.056) (0.055)
0.303*** 0.304*** 0.152*** 0.149***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029)
0.001* 0.001** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
- 0.006 0.018 0.104 0.170
(0.128) (0.127) (0.152) (0.18)
0.019 0.024 0.012 0.009
(0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012)
0.031 0.037 0.104*** 0.103***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.034) (0.034)
- 0.010 - 0.011 - 0.017*** - 0.016***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
0.019 0.017 0.01 0.007
(0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026)
0.243 0.291 - 1.269* - 1.448*
(1.038) (1.043) (0.69) (0.754)
- 0.078** - 0.078** 0.023 0.026
(0.033) (0.032) (0.023) (0.023)
- 0.014 - 0.015 0.041 0.062
(0.043) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041)
Citation shares to authorities and applicant residence included
Year dummies included
LR 127.03*** 128.16*** 108.14*** 101.66***
No. of Observations
§
 in mi l l ion EUR 
‡
 per no. of empl oyees
***
, 
**
, 
*
 i ndicate s i gnificance of 1%, 5% or 10%
Occasional R&D activities
Invest. in Innovation
Frms with small Frms with large
patent portfolios patent portfolios
Fragmentation Index                              
∆Fixed Assets
§
∆(No. of Employees)
§
Share Patents filed >20y
Share Triadic Patents
ln(Patent stock)
Continuous R&D activities
Credit rating
Fixed Asset Intensity
‡
ln(No.  of Employees)
ln(Age)
484
ln(Age)
2
Part of Conglomerate
Labour Cost Intensity
‡
Medium High-Tech Manuf.
High-Tech Manufacturing
484
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Table 5 Marginal R&D effect of capital stock gaps to subsets of cited patent owners  
 
 
  
0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.019
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.074 0.080 0.074 0.079 0.074 0.077
(0.121) (0.121) (0.120) (0.118) (0.121) (0.123)
0.100 0.103 0.103 0.105 0.098 0.103
(0.074) (0.075) (0.077) (0.071) (0.073) (0.076)
- 0.004 - 0.004 - 0.005 0.002 - 0.004 - 0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.01) (0.013) (0.012)
- 0.159*** - 0.165*** - 0.164*** - 0.157*** - 0.164*** - 0.163***
(0.06) (0.062) (0.064) (0.055) (0.062) (0.06)
0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
0.047* 0.047* 0.047* 0.045 0.046* 0.046*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
0.982 0.974 0.987 0.926 0.975 0.983
(0.669) (0.661) (0.672) (0.667) (0.661) (0.672)
0.036 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.035 0.036
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065)
0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.043
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
0.062* 0.063* 0.062* 0.060* 0.062* 0.063*
(0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Citation shares to authorities and applicant residence included
Year dummies included
No. of Observations
§
 in mi l l ion EUR 
R&D
968
Medium High-Tech Manuf.
High-Tech Manufacturing
ln(No.  of Employees)
ln(Age)
ln(Age)
2
Part of Conglomerate
Labour Cost Intensity
‡
Location in Eastern Germany
           …to smallest cited patentee
           …to largest cited patentee
           …to seldom cited patentees
           …to most cited patentee
Credit rating
Fixed Asset Intensity
‡
Fragmentation Index                              
∆Fixed Assets to...
§
           …X- or Y-citations
           …non-X- and non-Y-citations
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Table 6 Marginal innovation effect of capital stock gaps to subsets of cited patent owners 
 
- 0.034* - 0.032 - 0.030 - 0.034* - 0.034* - 0.032*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
- 0.00001**
(0.000007)
- 0.00001**
(0.000006)
- 0.00002***
(0.000007)
- 0.000007**
(0.000003)
- 0.00002***
(0.000006)
0.000006
(0.000007)
0.062 0.050 0.066 0.039 0.073 0.055
(0.083) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083)
- 0.003 0.002 - 0.005 - 0.016 0.008 0.003
(0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065)
0.015** 0.017** 0.020*** 0.009 0.019*** 0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
0.255*** 0.260*** 0.257*** 0.266*** 0.264*** 0.258***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
0.229*** 0.229*** 0.225*** 0.234*** 0.230*** 0.229***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.042 0.040 0.046 0.028 0.043 0.039
(0.069) (0.068) (0.065) (0.066) (0.063) (0.073)
0.020** 0.019** 0.021*** 0.020** 0.021*** 0.019**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
0.065*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.070***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
- 0.013*** - 0.014*** - 0.014*** - 0.014*** - 0.014*** - 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.023 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.021
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
- 0.636 - 0.621 0.671 0.596 - 0.549 - 0.675
(0.57) (0.572) (0.571) (0.576) (0.583) (0.574)
0.005 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.010 0.005
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039)
- 0.018 - 0.017 - 0.014 - 0.018 - 0.018
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
0.022 0.022 0.026 0.029 0.026 0.022
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Citation shares to authorities and applicant residence included
Year dummies included
No. of Observations
§
 in mi l l ion EUR 
Invest. in Innovation
968
Location in Eastern Germany
Medium High-Tech Manuf.
High-Tech Manufacturing
           …X- or Y-citations
           …non-X- and non-Y-citations
           …to smallest cited patentee
           …to largest cited patentee
           …to seldom cited patentees
           …to most cited patentee
Share Patents filed >20y
Share Triadic Patents
ln(Patent stock)
Occasional R&D activities
Continuous R&D activities
Fixed Asset Intensity
‡
ln(No.  of Employees)
ln(Age)
ln(Age)
2
Part of Conglomerate
Labour Cost Intensity
‡
Credit rating
Fragmentation Index                              
∆Fixed Assets to...
§
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Table 7 Marginal investment effect of capital stock gaps to subsets of cited patent owners 
 
0.011 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.011
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.00002**
(0.000006)
0.095 0.087 0.094 0.090 0.097 0.107
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
0.120 0.109 0.129 0.113 0.115 0.138
(0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
- 0.015* - 0.015* - 0.018** - 0.015 - 0.017* - 0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.009) (0.008)
- 0.079 - 0.080 - 0.084 - 0.082 - 0.085 - 0.086*
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
- 0.040 - 0.040 - 0.039 0.041 - 0.041 - 0.041
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.083 0.070 0.075 0.072 0.081 0.097
(0.155) (0.146) (0.156) (0.15) (0.156) (0.162)
0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
0.066** 0.061* 0.063** 0.062* 0.061* 0.062**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
- 0.011** - 0.010** - 0.010** - 0.010** - 0.010** - 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
- 0.005 - 0.005 - 0.003 - 0.005 - 0.003 - 0.005
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
- 0.801 - 0.792 - 0.773 - 0.793 - 0.809 - 0.83
(0.734) (0.733) (0.733) (0.733) (0.733) (0.732)
- 0.084 - 0.082 - 0.086* - 0.082 - 0.086* - 0.087*
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
- 0.033 - 0.033 - 0.037 - 0.033 - 0.036 - 0.034
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
- 0.094*** - 0.092*** - 0.094*** - 0.092*** - 0.094*** - 0.089***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Citation shares to authorities and applicant residence included
Year dummies included
No. of Observations
§
 in mi l l ion EUR 
Labour Cost Intensity
‡
Location in Eastern Germany
Medium High-Tech Manuf.
High-Tech Manufacturing
968
Credit rating
Fixed Asset Intensity
‡
ln(No.  of Employees)
ln(Age)
ln(Age)
2
Part of Conglomerate
           …to most cited patentee
Share Patents filed >20y
Share Triadic Patents
ln(Patent stock)
Occasional R&D activities
Continuous R&D activities
∆Fixed Assets to...
§
           …X- or Y-citations
           …non-X- and non-Y-citations
           …to smallest cited patentee
           …to largest cited patentee
           …to seldom cited patentees
Residual Invest.
Fragmentation Index                              
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